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 In formulating posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for the first time in 1980, the 
American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-III committee was obliged to rely on evidence and 
theory concerning responses to a variety of serious but not necessarily traumatic stressors. 
They also had available detailed case material, largely from people exposed to trauma over 
long periods (war veterans, victims of domestic violence). Accordingly, the picture of PTSD 
that emerged emphasised the impact of extreme, usually chronic stressors. It consisted of 
twelve symptom criteria, organised into re-experiencing, numbing of responsiveness to the 
external world, and a miscellaneous group of cognitive or autonomic symptoms. PTSD in 
DSM-III differed from earlier stress-related diagnoses in being a potentially chronic 
condition and not requiring that the person be free of prior or concurrent psychopathology. 
By the time of DSM-III-R in 1987, PTSD was becoming a more common diagnosis applied 
to less extreme stressors than had originally been envisaged, including single experienced 
incidents, witnessed events, and severe events happening to close others, particularly 
relatives. The number of symptom criteria increased to seventeen. The numbing symptoms of 
DSM-III were expanded to include psychogenic amnesia and a greater emphasis on deliberate 
avoidance, and the miscellaneous symptoms divided between the existing two symptom 
clusters and a third cluster reflecting high arousal. 
 In 1994 DSM-IV introduced objective and subjective stressor criteria, whereby the 
diagnosis required not just a specific type of traumatic event but a reaction involving fear, 
helplessness or horror. Significant distress or functional impairment was also required. DSM-
5 in 2013 brought further changes, with symptoms reflecting deliberate avoidance and 
numbing being placed in separate clusters with their own thresholds, and three additional 
symptoms being added. The requirement for fear, helplessness and horror was removed in 
favour of a symptom reflecting a greater breadth of negative emotions. Although a number of 
important improvements were made, PTSD remained the most complex disorder in the DSM 
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manual, with over 630,000 different combinations of symptoms qualifying for the diagnosis 
(Galatzer-Levy & Bryant, 2013). As originally formulated in DSM-III, it continued to reflect 
the varied and symptomatic presentations that are more strongly associated with chronic or 
repeated trauma than with single-incident trauma. One consequence has been that cases of 
‘partial PTSD’ accompanied by functional impairment are often identified in adults and 
children, suggesting that the threshold might be too high. Under DSM-5 rules, however, 
significant alterations to the criteria were not able to be introduced without compelling 
evidence (Friedman, 2013). 
 It was against this background that the proposals for measuring PTSD in ICD-11 were 
formulated. As noted by Danzi and La Greca (2016), these involved a radical shift designed 
to simplify diagnosis and distinguish PTSD from other disorders by focussing on a small set 
of six core symptoms, two from each of three clusters reflecting re-experiencing of the 
traumatic event in the present, deliberate avoidance, and a continued sense of threat. The 
rationale for the choice of symptoms has been explained elsewhere (Brewin, 2013; Brewin, 
Lanius, Novac, Schnyder, & Galea, 2009). Fear and horror resumed their central place in 
PTSD, although it was recognised that they were not always the most prominent emotions. In 
contrast to ICD-10, functional impairment was now required. Preliminary structural analyses 
suggest that the three symptom clusters fit the data well. Prevalence estimates indicate that in 
adult samples rates of ICD-11 PTSD are substantially lower then ICD-10 and broadly 
comparable to, but often slightly lower, than DSM-based PTSD. The overlap between cases 
identified using different systems tends to be low, however. 
 The fact that PTSD in children might present differently was recognised in DSM-III-
R, and the accumulation of empirical data has strongly indicated that as a result PTSD is 
likely being under-diagnosed (Scheeringa, Zeanah, & Cohen, 2011). This has now resulted in 
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the pre-school subtype introduced in DSM-5. The subtype recognises that the nature of 
traumatic intrusions may be different in this age group, with the possibility of repetitive play 
and of an absence of overt distress. Further, the difficulty in identifying avoidance and 
numbing means that the threshold for these symptoms is greatly reduced. However, the 
impact of developmental factors on diagnosing PTSD in older children has not received 
sufficient systematic attention (Scheeringa et al., 2011).  
Although ICD-11 has not yet specifically considered whether its proposed PTSD 
criteria need to be modified for children, it would appear that the absence of numbing 
symptoms might facilitate the diagnosis. To date two studies have compared ICD-11 with 
DSM-IV criteria. One recruited a sample of traumatised children and adolescents who had 
already been selected to receive treatment and were required to show one re-experiencing, 
avoidance, and hyperarousal symptom (Sachser & Goldbeck, 2016). Although the lower 
ICD-11 avoidance criterion had the effect of including extra cases, overall the requirement to 
report specific re-experiencing and hyperarousal symptoms led to a reduction in prevalence 
from 76% to 61% relative to DSM-IV. There was considerable comorbidity in the sample, 
and it is possible that those losing a PTSD diagnosis would still have qualified for another 
diagnosis. Another investigation recruited adolescents and young adults involved in two 
school shootings (Haravuori, Kiviruusu, Suomalainen, & Marttunen, 2016). In this case use 
of ICD-11 resulted in a slightly higher prevalence rate than DSM-IV (22% vs. 19%), and 
reflected more significant exposure to the traumatic incident. 
Danzi and La Greca’s (2016) findings are therefore important, both in focussing on 
the 7-11 year old age group and in comparing ICD-11 with DSM-IV and DSM-5. Like 
Haravuori et al.’s sample, Danzi and La Greca’s children had not been preselected for 
treatment and so were likely to be more representative of those exposed to trauma than those 
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studied by Sachser and Goldbeck (2016). Again like Haravuori et al., Danzi and La Greca 
found relatively low levels of symptoms reflecting problems with cognition and mood, 
prevalence rates that were broadly similar across diagnostic systems, and relatively low levels 
of agreement between cases identified using different systems. Despite this all systems were 
associated with risk factors established in the literature. What is potentially important is that 
in both studies ICD-11 uniquely identified more children than the DSM-based classifications.  
The findings reported by Danzi and La Greca (2016) have a number of significant 
implications. As they note, it may well be that the preschool subtype of PTSD identified in 
DSM-5 needs to be employed with older children as well. The disagreement between 
identified cases, characteristic of the adult as well as the child literature, is also concerning, 
but prompts us to look more critically at how we diagnose PTSD and whether DSM-5 and 
ICD-11 have accurately described the disorder. Although Danzi and La Greca’s results may 
indicate that ICD-11 has greater sensitivity for this age group, they found some cases 
identified by DSM-based systems that were not identified by ICD-11. It is important not to 
assume that one of the diagnostic systems is necessarily better than the other but to use the 
discrepancies to refine both systems and to clarify the boundaries with frequently comorbid 
conditions such as depression. The way PTSD is conceptualised has been evolving since 
1980 and ICD-11 has raised a number of new and important questions. What we do know is 
that PTSD is often a chronic condition among children associated with lasting disadvantage 
(Scheeringa et al., 2011). It is therefore a matter of great urgency to address these diagnostic 
questions and ensure children who need our help are not overlooked. 
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